Expertise and intuitions about reference

Machery, E (2012) Expertise and intuitions about reference. Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia, 27 (1). 37 - 54. ISSN 0495-4548

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Abstract

Many philosophers hold that experts' semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people's intuitions - a thesis commonly called "the Expertise Defense." Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Machery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY
Date:	26 April 2012
Date Type:	Publication
Access Restriction:	No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Journal or Publication Title:	Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia
Volume:	27
Number:	1
Page Range:	37 - 54
Institution:	University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0495-4548
Article Type:	Review
Date Deposited:	01 Mar 2013 16:16
Last Modified:	08 Aug 2022 18:34
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17455

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